This article represents the outcome of a dialogue between a vet and a healthcare ethicist on the theme of 'love' in professional life. We focus on four types or varieties of love (eros, agape, philia and storge) in relation to the professional care of humans and animals. We discuss the relevance of Fromm's core elements of love (care, responsibility, respect and knowledge) and consider the implications of these for human and animal health care practice. We present and respond to five arguments that might be waged against embracing love as a professional value in veterinary and medical practice. We argue that a moderated love can and should be reclaimed as a contemporary professional value. It is most helpfully contextualised within virtue ethics or care ethics. We suggest that love is a rich starting point from which to launch an exploration of an interprofessional humanimal clinical ethics.
Introduction
'It's all very well for you to talk about loving your patients' said the doctor to the vet. 'You don't risk getting romantically involved with them'.
Love, it has been claimed, is all we need. Reference to love is everywhere. It is the theme of many songs and works of literature, theatre, opera and art. Love has also been the focus of much philosophical and theological scholarship and is a core value within major world religions. Whereas many will struggle to define love, most will admit to having been 'in love' and to loving family, friends and animal companions. In personal life, few can resist the trappings of romantic and erotic love. Milligan has argued that '(w)e need to love and to be loved if we are to live well' and that 'life without love would fall dreadfully short'. 1 The role of love in professional practice is a more ethically challenging matter as our opening quotation suggests.
This article represents the outcome of a dialogue between a specialist vet and a care ethicist on the meaning and implications of love in their respective animal and human care practices. The vet (NF) has unapologetically and wholeheartedly claimed love as the primary ethical underpinning of his veterinary practice. The ethicist (AG) has been challenged by interview data where residential care-givers claim to unreservedly 'love' the people with dementia they provide care to. It seems likely that there will be scepticism regarding the appropriateness of love as a value in any professional care context and it is to this we respond.
We explore the potential of a perspective on love from Fromm. 2 We present and respond to five arguments that might be waged against embracing love as a professional value for human and animal health. We argue that whilst love can be reclaimed as a contemporary professional value, it is most helpfully contextualised within virtue ethics. First, we engage with four varieties or types of love.
A typology of love
A typology of love could include any word which has the element phil from the Greek philein which means 'to love'. As might be expected, there is an extensive list of objects of love (with prefix philo) and a good number of different types or varieties of love, for example, eros, agape, philia, ludus, pragma, storge, philotherianism and philautia. For our purposes here, regarding what love means and how it manifests in human and animal health care, we focus on four varieties of love: eros, agape, philia and storge.
Eros is the type of love the doctor had in mind when he challenged the vet in the opening quotation. It involves an emotional and romantic response and is based on desire or want. Philosophical discussions of eros can be traced to Plato's The Symposium. Although there is much literary and cultural attention to this kind of love, to romantic love, it can be an unstable and paradoxical predicament. Comte-Sponville 3 argued that eros is both one of the 'strongest' and 'most violent' forms of love. He writes that this form of love is also: the greatest source of suffering, failure, illusion and disillusionment. Eros is its name, want is its essence and passionate love is its culmination. Want necessarily means suffering and possessiveness. I love you means I want you. (p.238) This is not, therefore, an appropriate type of love for care professionals to engage in. Fitness to practise hearings for health professionals regularly deal with complaints relating to sexual misconduct in relation to patients and the violation of professional boundaries. Such complaints are less common, but not unheard of, in relation to veterinary professionals. 4 Humans and animals need to be protected from sexual abuse and professionals need to be aware of the requirements to maintain appropriate professional boundaries.
The second type of love is agape. Jackson 5 states that agape is derived from the New Testament Greek word for 'both God's love for the world and the love that finite persons should have for one another'. From an ethical point of view, agape may be described as the unconditional love we ought to have for other humans. Jackson identifies three features of agape to which he adds some caveats: that 'unconditional commitment' does not mean unreflectively or unreservedly complying with the wishes of others; that 'equal regard' does not mean treating everyone the same; and that 'passionate service' should be motivated by a charitable response.
This type of love is also referred to as loving kindness and most cited in relation to human-to-human relationships underpinned by Christianity. As agape has been described as 'universal love', it can be extended to include unconditional love for non-human animals and can also be underpinned by a nonreligious perspective.
Philia is the third type of love in this typology and most closely associated with friendship. While eros is described as 'love as want', philia is described as 'love as joy'. Comte-Sponville 3 associates this compelling form of love with tenderness, complicity, loyalty, humour and 'intimacy of body and mind'. An important element is mutual respect contributing to joy and a 'sense of peace' (p. 257).
Whereas this type of love suggests some ethical hazards in relation to patients (as discussed below) it seems very plausible that it is the kind of love that is present in good care teams, where there is mutual respect, warmth and collegiality.
The fourth type of love -storge -has also been related to friendship. It is primarily related to love in families, the unconditional love that parents have for their children. This love is committed and strives to bring about comfort and security. Vets, in particular, are aware that humans love and value their animal companions., Storge can, therefore, be extended to include love for animals in families. Cuomo and Gruen 6 discuss the possibility of friendship with animals arguing that: What these four types of love have in common is that they are, at first glance, human-focused (anthropocentric). However, as suggested in relation to agape and storge and perhaps also philia, it is possible to include love of other species. In the next section, we examine the potential of Fromm's discussion of love for human and animal health care.
Love is. . .
There is an abundance of literature pertaining to literary, theological and philosophical perspectives on love. Theologians continue to debate the meaning and implications of the writing of Saint Augustine on 'rightly ordered love' 7 and of Thomas Aquinas on love as friendship. 8 In an early seminal work on love, Fromm 9 writes of love as 'an art' that requires theory and practice. He argues that love is the 'answer to the problem of human existence'. The human predicament, according to Fromm, relates to the awareness of separateness, aloneness and helplessness 'before the forces of nature and of society, all of this makes his separate, disunited existence an unbearable prison (p. 8). The 'deepest need' of humans is then to overcome this separateness and aloneness and this is where love becomes necessary.
Connectedness in love enables humans to overcome their aloneness and separateness. Fromm 9 argues that there are four 'core' elements 'common to all kinds of love' and they are 'care, responsibility, respect and knowledge' (p. 26).
A mother's love for her child is given as an exemplar demonstrating the necessary relationship between love and care. If a mother did not feed, bathe or comfort her child, her love for the child would be in question. Fromm 9 goes on to say that 'it is not different even for the love for animals or flowers' as 'love is the active concern for the life and the growth of that which we love. Where this active concern is lacking, there is no love' (p. 26). Fromm goes on to say 'one loves that for which one labors, and one labors for that which one loves' (p. 27).
Regarding responsibility, Fromm 9 acknowledges that this could be taken to refer to 'duty', to something that is imposed from an external influence. However, responsibility 'is an entirely voluntary act' and involves responses to the needs of others. He writes, To be 'responsible' means to be able and ready to 'respond'. (p. 28)
The third element of love, described by Fromm, 9 is 'respect'. Respect prevents responsibility from deteriorating into 'domination and possessiveness' (p. 28). Fromm points out that the root of the word 'respect' is respicere means 'to look at'. Respect involves seeing a person as he/she is and having a concern that he/she will flourish. It involves also wanting the person to grow for his/her own sake and not 'for the purpose of serving me' (p. 28).
The final element of love, identified by Fromm, 9 is 'knowledge'. This is an aspect that 'penetrates to the core' of love (p. 29) and is possible when self-concern is overcome in favour of concern for the other.
Getting to know and understand another person is a key component of loving. The quest is to know the other and oneself 'objectively' (p. 31).
It is our view that Fromm's four elements of lovecare, responsibility, respect and knowledge -have the potential to elaborate an account of love as a professional value. Although the account focuses primarily on human-to-human relationships this can be developed to accommodate human and animal relationships in veterinary practice also. We will return to this in a later section.
All animals are equal. . .?
It is tempting and, seemingly, less ethically complicated to draw a line in the sand between species: humans on the one side and non-human animals on the other. Humans, it might be argued, are members of the moral community, inherently valuable and deserving of special protection and respect that animals are not. Unlike animals, humans are not bred for food, killed for their skin, sacrificed for medical experimentation or 'put down' when further intervention is considered futile (although in some jurisdictions voluntary euthanasia of humans is permitted).
But on what basis are humans considered more valuable? Why might they be more worthy of moral consideration? Are moral distinctions across species defensible? And what are the implications of responses to these questions for veterinary and human healthcare?
It is common for philosophers to engage their moral imaginations with lifeboat scenarios. In The Case for Animal Rights, Regan 10 argues that 'beings with inherent value have rights' and that 'subjects of a life' have this inherent value which includes only self-conscious beings with beliefs and desires. Regan invites us to respond to the following scenario:
Imagine five survivors are on a lifeboat. Because of limits of size, the boat can only support four. All weigh approximately the same and would take up approximately the same amount of space. Four of the five are normal human beings. The fifth is a dog. One must be thrown overboard or all will perish. Whom should it be? (p. 285) Regan 10 presents the arguments to support throwing the dog overboard in terms of the great value of the humans and the lesser harm caused by the loss of the dog. Gruen, however, argues that it is not clear why humans are worse off being killed than the dog. The desire that a person has to accomplish their goals is presumably just as great for a dog, even if the goals are very different (p. 347).
Regan's 10 view either paralyses or leads to a contradiction by 'maintaining that all are equal but in certain cases some are more equal than others' (p. 347). A utilitarian analysis of the lifeboat dilemma majors on equal interests being treated equally and the maximisation of happiness: 'the being who is most likely to lead an unhappy life will be the one to go' (pp.343-344). A view from preference utilitarianism could result in the same conclusion as Regan but for different reasons. All in all, the sacrificing or saving of lifeboat passengers has to be based on some defensible ethical criteria: Is it the maximisation of happiness? The satisfaction of preferences? Or something else?
A different and, in our view, more defensible criterion for the lifeboat dilemma and for the treatment and care of animals more generally, comes from 18th-century utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham:
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny.
[. . .]. It may one day come to be recognised that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose it were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? But Can they suffer? 11 Whilst moral progress may have been made in reducing some forms of discrimination, the quest for animal rights is not so advanced. Singer's book Animal Liberation was published in 1973 and 'challenged the attitude that animals are ours to use in whatever way we think fit'. 12 Human rights discourse now engages with many forms of discrimination against humans (for example, racism, ageism, sexism, disablism and homophobia). However, this has not resulted in the end of discrimination against humans who are different, disadvantaged or marginalised. There is ample evidence that humans are not all treated equally and are also judged as being more or less valuable. Gruen 12 (p. 344) points out, some categories of humans are incapable of making moral decisions (infants, young children, people with severe dementia, people in comas, etc.) and may be considered as 'marginal' humans. The phenomenon of 'speciesism' (favouring one's own species) is now fairly well recognised and legislation is in place to protect animals against cruelty, for example. However, there is some way to go before animals are afforded similar consideration to that of humans who suffer. Sentience is, in our view, the critical feature of humans and animals that grant them special moral consideration.
Not all animals are viewed in the same way with some viewed as more or less desirable than others. Regarding 'companion animals' (this is preferred to 'pets'), for example, Archer 13 suggests those more acceptable have: 'baby features'; are of 'a certain size and intelligence'; are 'warmblooded and feel better to the touch'; have fur; and must have similar waking patterns to ourselves. There is also a significant difference in the relationships between different kinds of animals and humans. Those who have companion animals like dogs, cats or rats may think of themselves as the family or guardians of the animal. Those who breed racehorses and animals for food or clothing may think of themselves as 'owners' and the animals as 'property' that enhance and, perhaps, sustain their human life. In the latter two cases, then, the animals may be thought of as a means to an end whereas in the case of companion animals, the animal may be considered a valuable family member with its own individuality.
There is, then, a tendency to categorise humans and animals in different ways. Humans have been referred to as 'marginal' should they lack capacity for decisionmaking. 12 In decisions about healthcare, the distinction becomes very real as those who lack capacity (infants, children, those who are comatose or with severe dementia) will have decisions made 'in their best interests'. In relation to (non-human) animals, assumed to lack capacity for decision-making regarding their care and treatment, different kinds of distinctions are made. Vets who care primarily for animal companions have to consider a range of questions, not dissimilar to those asked by doctors in relation to patients who lack capacity, such as: Is the patient suffering? In whose 'best interest is the proposed intervention? What is going to contribute most to the flourishing of the patient? And -a question that does not apply in the UK National Health Service for humans -can the family pay for the care and treatment?
Embracing love as a professional value would go some way to redressing the discrimination and inequalities encountered by human and animal patients alike. Whilst it may not be the case that love is premised on the value of the human, animal or object of our affection, it seems clear that love is too rarely discussed in relation to other creatures. And, of course, love is hardly discussed at all in relation to professionals' engagement with patients, being viewed as ethically problematic.
We turn now to these perceived challenges.
The trouble with love in professional life: Five challenges
At least five challenges could be waged against our claim that love is a core value for human and animal health care: it fosters favouritism; it increases the risk of violating professional boundaries; makes professionals more vulnerable and promotes burnout; it reduces therapeutic effectiveness and objectivity; and it is not possible to love all humans and animals. We will respond to each of these.
Love fosters favouritism
It could be argued that if human or animal care-givers love their patients they may provide preferential treatment and care to those they love more. This is a potential consequence of care work generally and not likely to change by adopting love as a core value. It is crucial that the type of love is identified and reflected on by professionals. As argued above, it is our view that three types of love have most relevance to professional practice. Agape involves unconditional love and loving kindness towards all patients and their families being mindful of the potential for favouritism. Rather than having a separate category of love of animals (philotherianism), agape should be taken to mean love of all creatures (human and non-human) and the quest should be to get to know and understand each integrating the four elements of care discussed by Fromm 2 : care, responsibility, respect and knowledge. The second type of love that enhances professional practice is philia. Although some professionals, mainly vets, may work independently it is important that they have networks of work and non-work friends who provide love and assist with work-life balance. Work colleagues can also enable doctors and vets to find space and time, for example in supervision, to reflect on their practice and address any issues of potential favouritism. The third kind of love that vets and doctors need to take seriously is storge. Understanding the family context of human and animal patients is a core component of fair and compassionate care.
Love increases the risk of violating professional boundaries
The opening quotation suggests that whilst it may be acceptable for vets to love their patients, for human physicians this is physicians this hazardous. As highlighted in the discussion of eros above, professionals in human and animal health care practice run the risk of violating professional boundaries and of sexual misconduct should they sexually abuse their patients or families, taking advantage of their vulnerable status. The problem here is not that love increases the risk of sexual exploitation of patients but rather that it is the wrong type of love. As Stickley and Freshwater 14 point out:
We can, at times, feel so lonely and needy ourselves that we may be afraid to show our love for fear of falling in love with a person in our care. In order to maintain safe boundaries we need to know ourselves and reflect upon the lessons we have learned in the past with regard to love that we can apply to the present. (p. 253) If professionals understand the rationale for, and significance of, professional boundaries, they will guard against an erotic interest in patients and focus instead on agape, philia and storge.
Love makes professionals more vulnerable and promotes burnout
The idea that professionals should keep a professional distance from patients has been widespread in human healthcare. It has been argued that this is protective of patients and of those who provide care and treatment. If doctors and vets love their patients, there is the hazard of over-involvement and eventually burn-out as they have no more to give. Their emotional involvement, their love for their patients, makes them particularly vulnerable when further interventions are futile. In human health care, this may signal a transition to palliative care with a view to helping patients live as well as possible until they die. In veterinary practice, this may result in the families of animal companions agreeing that the patient should be 'euthanised'. In both care contexts, professionals are aware of the loss that will be endured by families and of their own vulnerability when a beloved patient dies.
A shift from what Van Heijst 15 calls 'the repertoire of intervention' to 'the repertoire of presence' would seem to be called for here. Van Heijst explains the interventionist approach this way:
The current dynamic of healthcare is built on the principle that workers get involved when there's a problem, deal with that issue (not with the rest of the patient's body, mind, life or social circle), and then withdraw. (p. 70)
Van Heijst (p. 77) points to a feature of the repertoire of intervention that can result in harm or distress to a patient, that is, 'the urge to carry out actions instead of refraining from them'. By contrast, the repertoire of presence or 'presence approach' is drawn from 'the natural world where the whole is entirely present in any of its parts' (p. 91).
The working principles of the presence approach include the prescriptions that: the workers open themselves up, they relate in an attentive way, they tune in to what's given, they are dynamic, at each other's disposal, exercise self-control and are devoted. 16 The presence approach is a part of what Van Heijst refers to as 'Professional Loving Care', a movement that has been gaining momentum in mainland Europe in relation to the health care of humans.
Love reduces therapeutic effectiveness and objectivity
There may be an idea that the judgement of those who provide evidence-based care and treatment to patients will be clouded by love and emotional engagement. Those who have been 'in love' may indeed recall how their decision-making was less than rational. However the love we are pitching for in professional practice in relation to patients and families is not erotic love (eros) but rather agape. This love, we suggest, entails the elements described by Fromm of: care, responsibility, respect and knowledge. There is also a practice mechanism that is likely to enhance the reflectivity of the professional and that is clinical supervision. As Stickley and Freshwater 14 state:
Clinical supervision not only acts as a quality control measure but also as a support to practitioners. It holds the potential of being a nurturing environment which, among other things, the art of caring and the art of loving can be fostered, examined, savoured, honoured and developed. (p. 255) This is also where philia can prove valuable.
Where practitioners have loving, friendly and trusting relationships with members of the care team, they can invite feedback and a range of perspectives on interventions being considered for patients. This may be particularly valuable where there are different opinions about what is in the best interests of the patient. An additional challenge relates more to the veterinary context and involves the financial aspects of care. Vets may feel embarrassed to discuss money in the context of love, particularly when families of animal companions cannot afford the best treatment option recommended by the vet. It can be a difficult balancing act as no vet wants to be accused of exploiting love to make financial gain. Ultimately, it will be a matter of balancing the desire of the animal companion family members against their financial wherewithal against the willingness of the veterinary surgeon to be compromised financially. There is potential for a great deal of ethical conflict here as vets may be aware of family members' guilt should they not be able to afford best treatment for their animal companion or may fear that the treatment may be carried out and payment will not be received which may result in acrimony and legal conflict.
Another ethically challenging situation for vets is when the families of animal companions will extend themselves beyond their means. The vet may have to caution against this because the prognosis may be poor. Agape, in our view, in such situations requires an open approach underpinned by care, responsibility, respect and knowledge of the patient and family. In the case of animals and patients who lack capacity these decisions would be focused on best interests and, where an adult human patient with capacity is involved, they must be at the centre of decision-making.
It is not possible to love all humans and animals equally
Readers are likely to be familiar with the line from George Orwell's fable 'Animal Farm' 17 : 'All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others'. In the story, the animals take over the farm usurping farmer Jones in their quest for freedom from slavery and equality, a stance they labelled 'Animalism'. Although a fable, the story evolved to a hierarchy in the animal world where some animals were considered more valuable and loveable than others. This is borne out in humans' perspectives on animals and on other humans. So, for example, it seems easier to love a policeman than a paedophile. Some might think it is easier also to love animals and humans in the prime of life rather than those who are aged or have degenerative conditions. However, it might be helpful for both animal and human care professionals to reflect on what they profess, perhaps captured in this definition 15 [our additions are in italics]:
Professional Loving Care is a practice of care in which competent and compassionate professionals interact with people and animals in their care; to them tuning in with the needs of each individual patient is a leading principle and if necessary they modify the procedures and protocols of the institution; the main purpose of this type of caring is not repair of the patients' body or mind, but the care-receivers' experience of being supported and not being left on their own; important, too, is that all people concerned in healthcare (professionals, care-receivers and their families) are able to feel that they matter as unique and precious individuals. (p. 3) We appreciate that emphasising a holistic patientcentred approach to care which reinforces the dignity of each patient may go some way to helping professionals respond lovingly to patients they do not feel warmly towards. The perspective of Iris Murdoch 18 may help here. She writes of looking with a 'just and loving eye' which involves looking again and reframing a patient considered difficult.
Reclaiming love for professional life
Thus far we have presented a typology of love and argued that agape, philia and storge are the most pertinent types in relation to human and animal health professional care. Our claim is that 'love of animals' can be captured by an approach to agape that focuses on the reduction of suffering and loving kindness. We have engaged with five potential objections that might be made to the idea that love should be a core professional value in animal and human health care.
Other authors have argued for a type of love in professional practice. Writing in 1984 Campbell, 19 for example, described a 'moderated love' in relation to medicine, nursing and social work. Campbell writes:
The professions are (or should be) moderators of love in this first sense [as 'first among equals']. Since they claim an ethics of agape, they stand between the weak and the strong in society. They can ensure that through their work the disadvantages of weakness are evened out and each person is given equal consideration as an individual of worth [. . .] The caring professions can offer 'moderated love'. Here, indeed, their particular skill and usefulness is most clearly seen [. . .] the professional does not and cannot love (or hate) a person as a relative or friend does. There is a necessary detachment in professional care. Yet it is love which the professional offers, however moderated. It is a reaching out to another in the desire to enhance the value which is seen, and such reaching-out requires the non-rational connection which feeling alone can create. We employ the professional helper to maintain this balance of reason and emotion [. . .] In the ideal at least, the climate of professional help is always a moderate one, temperate and without extremes and sudden changes. (p. 84-85) This is a lengthy quotation but it highlights well the appropriateness of the 'fit' between love and care practices. It is our view that Campbell's descriptions of moderated love can also apply to veterinary practice. We have referred to the work of Van Heijst and others who have written of 'Professional Loving Care'. This approach is of much interest and captures many of the features that could be said to capture an ethics that straddles human and animal professional healthcare. So too, the elements of love described by Fromm and the features of moderated love described by Campbell.
'Love' is a core value across human and animal professional health care and it is most appropriately contextualised within virtue ethics. The features of virtue ethics best accommodate the perceived weakness of a love-based ethics across human and animal care.
Virtue ethics is illuminating in relation to both human health and veterinary professionals. Virtue ethics is directed towards human and animal flourishing; it is pluralist; it incorporates the doctrine of the mean; and it is aspirational. 20 Facilitating the holistic flourishing of humans and animals is the telos or end aimed towards in human and animal care practice. Vets, doctors and other care professionals should aim to be fully present to patients and families with a view to understanding what is likely to enable them to flourish. A pluralist approach includes a range of virtues in addition to love. Fromm, for example, argued that professionals required care, respect, responsibility and knowledge as elements of love. Van Heijst highlighted the importance of compassion and Campbell suggests the importance of a moderated love. These most helpfully can be translated as virtues of care, respectfulness and practical wisdom. The latter virtue includes an appreciation of a sense of responsibility and a need to have knowledge of the patient and family.
Regarding the right expression of the virtues -in this case love -the doctrine of the mean is helpful As a reflective tool, a consideration of the vices that flank love enables professionals to avoid loving to excess (over-involvement, smothering, being unable to act in the best interests of patients resulting in excessive interventions perhaps) or loving deficiently (being callous, unkind, indifferent to the suffering of the patient). The fact that virtue ethics is an aspirational ethics reminds professionals of their fallibility and vulnerability and of the possibility of betterment. Reflecting on the demonstration of professional virtues such as love enables professionals to take stock of their relationships with patients, families and colleagues and to work towards ethical betterment.
Conclusion
We began this article with a quotation from a doctor following a presentation in which one of the authors (NF) had argued for the importance of love in veterinary practice. The doctor suggested that the idea of loving one's patients was more problematic in human medical practice as there was a risk of this signalling romantic involvement. In describing a typology of love we have demonstrated that eros is but one form of love. The type of love considered most appropriate for human and animal professional care is a form of agape that includes prioritising the reduction of suffering and the promotion of flourishing in human and animal patients. We argued also that there is an important role for two other kinds of love in professional care practice: for philia which indicates friendship and collegiality in care teams and storge which helps moderate the love demonstrated towards patients and families. We would also emphasise the importance of professionals having self-love.
Initially one of the authors (AG) felt uneasy at the idea of care-givers' references to 'loving' the people with dementia they worked with. She had a view, not dissimilar to that reported by Van Heijst 15 that 'a discourse of love should be kept outside of their professional domain' (p. 19) . However, an analysis of the literature on love particularly as outlined by virtue theorists 3 , care ethicists 15 and other authors 1,2 suggests new and interesting angles on the concept of love that convinces us of its relevance to human and animal professional care. Further philosophical scholarship is recommended to develop the concept of love within different philosophical perspectives such as virtue ethics and care ethics.
Accounts of professional ethics as they relate to human health care and veterinary practice are most usually segregated within texts on health care ethics primarily directed towards professionals working with humans and different texts directed towards veterinary professionals working with animals. The current interest in 'one health' 21 suggests the timeliness of considering less how humans and animals differ and more on what they have in common -their sentience and their capacity to suffer. Rather than the humanism that underpins secular healthcare ethics or the animalism suggested in Animal Farm we aim to prompt the beginning of a discussion regarding a humanimal ethics 22 (a move towards One Health One Ethics?). Love may not be all we need for this but the virtue of love -most significantly agape -appears to be a rich, albeit modest, launch pad to begin this expansive exploration.
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